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1935

Report of the Delegates  
of the United States of America  
Text of the London Naval Treaty of 1936  
and Other Documents

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MINUTES OF THE TENTH MEETING OF THE FIRST  
COMMITTEE, JANUARY 15, 1936

Present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Monsell, G.B.E., First Lord of the  
Admiralty (in the Chair).

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JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON UPPER  
LIMIT OF NAVAL TONNAGE.

(Resumption of Discussion)

THE CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen at the last meeting of the Committee the Japanese Delegation declared their inability to discuss matters relating to the exchange of naval information until there had been a final discussion of the question of quantitative limitation. At subsequent unofficial meetings with the United Kingdom Delegation, the Japanese Delegation made it clear that they desired to return at the first opportune moment to a discussion of their proposal for a common upper limit and that they would like to hear the definitive views of the various Delegations on this question. At these meetings between the two Delegations it was accordingly decided to ask the other Delegations whether, in view of this Japanese request, the Committee would be prepared to resume as their first business the discussion of the Japanese proposal for a common upper limit. This proposal has already been considered at five sittings, but I feel sure that the Committee would be glad to hear any further arguments which the Japanese Delegation may wish to offer in its favour and to learn whether that Delegation have any alternative quantitative proposals they desire to put forward. In their turn the other Delegations will no doubt be prepared to give their full and definitive views on the Japanese proposal. Once this has been done I hope the Japanese Delegation will agree to continue the discussion of the various other important questions before the Conference. Before, however, proceeding with the discussion of the Japanese proposal, I should like to make sure that everyone here is in agreement with the proposal I have just put forward.



As there is no objection I will ask the Japanese Delegation to make a statement of their proposal.

Admiral NAGANO (Translation): I desire to state at the outset that we very much appreciate the opportunity that has been given us to-day to resume examination of the Japanese proposals and, to save time, I shall with your permission have the statement of the Japanese Delegation read to you in translation.

The statement was as follows: -

1. Although I have tried at past meetings of this Committee to explain our proposal at considerable length and in sufficient detail to clarify its purport as well as to point out its implications, it does not appear that I have succeeded in my task to the extent of removing all doubts from the minds of the other Delegations. I wish to be permitted to-day, therefore, to undertake a further elaboration of our plan by supplementing the explanations already given and, in order to assure a more complete understanding of our proposals, to offer our views on certain of the observations which the other Delegations have been good enough to make with reference thereto.

If any part of what I am about to say appears to you to be in the nature of repetition of statements I have already made, I can only ask your indulgence, for I feel that a certain measure of repetition is inevitable if I am to present the Japanese plan to you in the clearest possible light.

I wish further to state - with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers - that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desire for world peace. It is our guiding principle in international politics that all nations should strive to promote international amity and good will on a basis of mutual understanding, that it should be made possible for all peoples, happily free from anxieties concerning their national security, to work out their respective destinies in an atmosphere of happiness and contentment that can only come as a blessing of peace among nations.

In considering possible measures for attaining agreement upon disarmament, therefore, we have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war, and the assurance of an equality of security for all Powers concerned. A plan of disarmament, to be adopted, must, of course, be one which does not give rise to the fallacious notion that there can be any justification for discriminatory treatment between nations, and we have taken great care to assure that the plan should moreover be a practical one.

Having devised our plan with due consideration and careful thought to the three points I have just mentioned, I believe that the Japanese proposal is at once fair, just and practical, and is characterised by a high degree of elasticity. So that if the Delegations will examine our proposal carefully and with sympathy, I feel that no serious difficulty will be encountered in discovering therein a reasonable basis for a new agreement on disarmament.

As we are now about to enter on the final examination of the Japanese proposal, I venture to express the hope that the Delegations will find it possible, without undue attachment to existing facts or past circumstances, to approach the task in hand with a firm determination to draft a new and the very best possible plan, and, to that end, to study and discuss the Japanese proposal from every possible angle and with a sympathetic understanding of its spirit and purpose.

II. If any Power were to put forward a claim for a very large naval force in anticipation of a need therefor arising simultaneously in various parts of the world, such a claim might, in effect, amount to a demand for a naval force sufficient to deal with two or more Powers. Such a demand might tend to militate against the chances of reaching agreement on the disarmament question, which should, in any case, be considered on the basis of a "one Power versus one Power" relationship.

If two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strength of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would at once be fair and just, and this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by oceans and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.



Moreover, when we consider the high degree of mobility of naval armaments and the peculiar character of naval warfare, the need of defensive equality for all Powers demands that there shall be equality of naval forces and especially of those categories which form the backbone of the fleet. It is for this reason that the Japanese proposal provides for equality, category by category, in "A" class cruisers and all larger types. But as regards categories whose use is exclusively defensive, suitable adjustments should be made to meet the special circumstances of each Power; hence the provision of the Japanese proposals that, as regards "B" class cruisers and all lesser types, limitation shall be effected globally. It is a peculiar characteristic of naval forces that they can be moved about at will with great facility; and it goes without saying that this characteristic will become more and more pronounced in the future as improvements in the technique of naval construction continue. It is, moreover, a fundamental rule of naval strategy that forces which are scattered over several seas shall be concentrated in a single area whenever necessary for technical reasons. That this can be done - and, what is more, that a Power can concentrate its forces in a particular area so as to constitute a mortal threat to another Power - is borne out by numerous instances in naval history. Consequently, when discussing naval relations between two countries, it is only reasonable that at least all the vessels capable of participating in naval engagements shall be taken into consideration, and, if the total of such vessels of one Power is superior to that of the other, the only possible consequence is that the inferior Power will have its sense of security impaired, while the superior naval Power will be in a position to exceed the actual needs of its national defence, even to the point of becoming a menace to others.

Moreover, in order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. To explain more fully, we advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and "A" class cruisers. But if there were a general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also, we should be ready to give our support thereto.

As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.

If this feature of the Japanese proposal were to be put into effect, we believe that naval forces would be largely deprived of their capacity for menacing other Powers. The complete abolition



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or drastic reduction of offensive armaments would not only result directly in a very substantial measure of reduction, but it would also have the indirect effect of producing still further reductions all round because the strengthening of the sense of security consequent on the disappearance of offensive types is bound to give rise to a general tendency on the part of the naval Powers to reduce further the sizes of their navies.

III. In order to bring once more to the minds of the Delegations the principal features of the Japanese proposal, I would now undertake to set forth the framework of our formula, somewhat as follows:-

(1) There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned might exceed. This maximum global tonnage must not only be a suitable one for practical purposes, but it must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament.

(2) Simultaneously with the determination of the global tonnage, there would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognised to be predominantly offensive in character - namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and "A" class cruisers - a common maximum tonnage and a common number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.

(3) As regards "B" class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognised to be essentially defensive, it should be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories, so as to make it possible for each Power to determine, in accordance with its own needs, the tonnage which it may deem appropriate in each of those categories.

(4) Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances, may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in "A" class cruisers, and increase its tonnage in any of the defensive categories mentioned in paragraph (3). Although there may conceivably be numerous ways of effecting the above-mentioned reduction and increase, we believe it should be made the subject of technical examination.

This provision, together with the provision of paragraph (3), would give to each Power a very wide scope for making adjustments so as to compensate for its vulnerability.

(5) Since the Powers concerned would be left to work out their naval problems according to their own free will within the scope of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the Japanese plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such a formula, for instance, as a declaration of naval building programmes.

(6) If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and, if it were proved to be reasonable and well-founded, Japan would not refuse its recognition. But since, as I have repeatedly explained, the establishment of a state of non-aggression and non-menace is at the very basis of our proposal, I think it can be readily understood that, while we might be able to recognise a claim for additional adjustment based on purely defensive needs arising from the special circumstances of the Power concerned, we could in no circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardise the state of non-aggression and non-menace.

Moreover, it is not intended that, a common upper limit having once been set, all Powers must build up to it. It goes without saying that each should restrict its navy to the smallest size with which its defensive needs can be adequately met. In this regard, goodwill and mutual trust among the various Powers are absolutely indispensable, and I believe the Committee will agree with us that, without such goodwill and mutual trust, agreement on any kind of a disarmament treaty is impossible, no matter by what formula or on what principles the attempt may be made.

If, on the other hand, it should be possible to deprive naval armaments of their capacity to menace other Powers, as is contemplated by the Japanese proposal, the various Powers would not feel the necessity of extensive naval constructions; in fact, there would probably be no Power that would even contemplate huge naval programmes. We believe, in other words, that there is no ground for apprehension that the establishment of a common upper limit will give impetus to a general movement for larger navies.

IV. May I be permitted at this stage to consider in the light of the basic conception underlying the Japanese proposal, which I have just explained, a few of the points raised by the other Delegations in the course of their observations upon our plan, for I feel that the explanation of our plan will be facilitated by my so doing.



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The view that a nation, by reason of its being also a Pacific Power, should be entitled to possess in the Pacific a naval strength equal to that of the other Powers in the same waters, in addition to other naval forces which it claims to be necessary in European waters or in the Atlantic Ocean, appears to us tantamount, in effect, to a claim to the right to possess a navy equal in strength to the combined strengths of the navies of two or more countries. Such a claim, it appears to us, may be said to be hardly commendable as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. And, as I have pointed out already, it would not be possible for us to support such a claim, in view of the highly mobile character of naval armaments.

We can readily understand that the possession of greater and more numerous overseas territories and lines of communication may well justify a demand for a greater strength than other Powers in small and purely defensive types of vessels which have no combatant capacity at sea, but which are suitable for coast patrol, defense of harbours and other similar purposes. But, if for the same reason, a Power should demand superiority in naval force as a whole, the sense of security of other Powers would thereby be disturbed. In any case, I believe it is a well-known fact that the conditions of nations whose naval forces are now on a basis of parity are not the same as regards their overseas possessions and lines of communication.

Frequent references have been made to the defensive needs of certain outlying possessions. But we find it difficult to see the reasonableness of a claim for superior forces for the defence of such outlying possessions if, as a consequence, the very heart of another Power will be menaced thereby.

It appears to us quite clear that a nation's ability to protect its overseas possessions and sea routes depends wholly upon whether or not it can control the seas.

Considering the question of overseas possessions and colonies from another angle, it would seem clear that, through the possession of such interests overseas, a nation enjoys the advantage of having bases and sources of supplies located in widely scattered parts of the world. That, we believe, may be an incalculable advantage, not only as regards the protection of lines of communication, but also in facilitating the movement and concentration of naval forces.

If we were to subscribe to the view that has been expressed, that a nation which is dependent on the sea requires a large naval force, it could be said for Japan that she too is wholly dependent on the sea. What is more, she is poor in natural resources and,



with her population exceeding in density that of any other country in the world, is forced to look to countries beyond the seas for the greater part of the supplies necessary to her existence as well as for the raw materials for her industries. There is thus a vast difference between Japan and the countries which, though obtaining part of their supplies from abroad, can nevertheless have most of their needs supplied by their own territorial possessions; and this difference becomes even more pronounced when comparison is made with a country which has an abundance of resources at home and which is for the most part self-supporting and self-sufficient. Considered in that light, it is difficult to see how a country, so situated as Japan is, can be expected to feel secure with a naval force inferior to that of another whose circumstances are far more favourable.

V. By way of conclusion, I desire to say that, while Japan will never cease to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament, that is not to say that she is going to insist on attaining the impossible.

The plan which the Japanese Delegation has submitted to this Conference was prepared in the light of the experience and results of past disarmament conferences, with due attention to the actualities of the international situation of the day and with careful consideration of the various relevant problems from every possible angle. And it is our conviction that through the adoption of the principles embodied in the Japanese proposal, the Conference would succeed in achieving a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament without serious difficulties.

Once the Japanese proposal is adopted by the Conference, the way could be found for incorporating therein the important features of the other proposals with such modifications as may be deemed suitable. For the Japanese proposal, as a formula for disarmament, is neither rigid nor academic. It is a practical one, marked by its comprehensive character and flexibility.

The Japanese Delegation, in submitting its proposal, was anxious that it should thereby be able to give satisfaction to all the Powers concerned in equal measure. It is only after the most careful study and mature consideration, prompted by our recognition of the urgent world-wide desire for effective measures of disarmament that we have brought ourselves to place our proposal before this Conference.

I therefore desire finally to urge that all the Delegates be good enough to give their most mature consideration to our plan sympathetically and with an open mind.

原文頁一

文書第ニ二五二一號 辯護團側用

注意

コノ文書ハ檢察側文書第ニ二五二一號中ノ尚他ノ部分  
ノ拔萃ヲモ欲シイトイフ被告側辯護人ノ要求ヲ包含シ  
一九四六年十一月十五日附裁判所命令(文書第ニ二五二九  
號)ニ依リ辯護團側文書トシテ複製セラレタモノデアル。  
コノ文書ハ或ル部分ハ既ニ檢察側ニ依リ証據トシテ提  
出セラレ法廷証第ニ二五二一A號トイフ番號ガツイテ居ル  
原文頁ニ

國務省會議錄第ニ四號

一九三五年倫敦軍縮會議

亞米利加合衆國代表委員報告書

一九三六年倫敦海軍條約ノ原文及其他ノ文書

印

在ワシントン合衆國政府印刷所

一九三六年

原文頁三

一九三六年一月十五日第一委員會第十回會議ノ  
議事要録

出席者

海軍大臣 G. B. E. モンセル / MONSELL / 子爵

(議長席)

× × × × × × × ×



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No. 2

軍艦噸數共通最大限度ニ對スル日本提案  
(討議續行)

議長。皆サン。前回、本委員會會議ニ於テ日本  
國代表ハ、總噸數限度問題、討議ガ終リテ  
イ限リ海軍情報交換ニ関スル諸件、討議ニ  
入ルコトハ出来ナイト言明セラレタリ。其、後英  
帝國代表ト、非公式會談ニ於テ日本國代表  
ハ成ルベク速ニ共通最大限度ニ對スル日本側  
提案、討議ヲ始メタイコト又コ、問題ニ関シ各  
國代表諸君、明確ナル意見ヲ承リタイトイフ  
コトヲ言ハレタリ。ソコデ兩國代表者間、是等  
ノ會談ニ於テ、日本側ノ要求ニ鑑ミ、委員  
會ハ其、且、初、仕事トシテ共通最大限度ニ  
對スル日本側、提案ヲ討議ヲ始メル用意ガア  
ルヤ否ヤ他、國々、代表諸君ニ諮ルコトニ決定  
改メタリ。

この提案、五回、御打合せ行は既ニ御考慮ニサツタコトアリマス  
 故私モ本委員会、日本國代表が其、提案未支持、タニ引續イテ  
 ナサシト思フ論議ヲ傾聴シ又同代表が提案ニツイト思フ噸數  
 限、反、代表がカルカドウカラ喜ニテ知ラウトニテ居ニト私、考ヘマス。  
 一方他、國々、代表方ニ於カセウシテモ必ズヤ日本代表、提案ニ対  
 シテ十分ニテ且明確ナル御意見ヲ御発表ニテ御用意ガ  
 アルコトト思ヒマス。コサヘ済マセマシツテ、日本代表、本會議  
 目下、他、重要諸案未、討論ヲ繼續スルコトニ同意セウシ様  
 私、希望致シマス。然レ日本國代表提案、討論ニ入ニ  
 先立テ私、私が今オ詔リ致シマシツテ提議ニ御出席、  
 皆様方が決シテ御同意ヲト云フコトヲ判然承ツテオキ  
 ツイト存ジマス。

反対モゴザイマセウカラ、日本國代表ニ御提案、御説明  
 ヲ願ヒ致シマス。

永野海軍大將(翻譯)私、先ツ、日本側提案審議  
 続ケルタメ本日、機會ヲオ與ヘ下サツタコトヲ深ク感謝  
 致シ居ルモデアルコトヲ申上ゲツイト存ジマス。

ソニテ時間節約、タメオ許ラ得テ日本代表、説明ヲ  
 翻譯文デ朗読シテ世具ヒツイト存ジマス。

説明、次、通リデアツタ。



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一私ハ本委員会、從來、會議ニ於テ、我が提案、自  
 的ヲ明カニシ且其ノ趣意ヲ明示スルタメニ隨分長  
 又詳細ニ亘ッテ説明致シマシタガ、他、代表諸君  
 、心中ヨリ疑惑ヲ一掃スル程度ニ私、仕事  
 ニ成功スルニ至ラナカツタ様ニ思ハシマス。  
 ソコデ本日ハ先ニ致シマシタ説明ヲ補足スルコ  
 トニ依リマシテ我々、計畫ヲ一層詳ニシ、我  
 々、提案ヲ尙十分了解シテ頂クタメニ他、  
 代表諸君ガ之ニ関シ今迄オ述べ下サツタ  
 ブ意見ニ就テ我々、考ヘマスルトコロヲ申  
 上ゲルコトニ致シタイト存ジマス。

若シ私、是カラ申シマスコト、ウチニ私ガ既  
 ニ申シマシタコト、重複スルヤウニ諸君ニ思  
 ハレル箇所ガゴザイマシタナラバ、日本ノ計畫  
 ヲ出来ルタケ判然タル状態ニ諸君ニ指示  
 シスルタメニ、多少ノ重複ハ避ケ得ナイコ  
 ト、考ヘマスノデ、コノ点即辛抱ヲオ願  
 致シ度イト思ヒマス。

私ハ他、國々ノ高キ市目的ニ十分、敬  
 意ヲ表シ、致シマスガ、世界平和ヲ希  
 求スルコトノ眞摯ヲ執意ト、ト、是ニ於  
 テハ他、何レノ玉座ニモ後シテ取ルモノデ  
 ハナイコトヲ茲ニ申上ゲタイト存ジマス。

No. 4

總テノ國家ハ相互ノ理解ノ上ニ國際間ニ親善ト好意ヲ増進スベキコト、又總テノ國民ハ夫々ノ國家ノ安全ニ就キ何等ノ危惧スルコトヲ各國民間ニ平和トイフ天惠が得ラレタ結果トシテ招来サル幸福ト満足ノ裡ニ、各國民が夫々其ノ使命達成ニ邁進スルコトヲ得ヤムルヤウニスルト云フノが我が國際政策指導精神ナリマス。

（原又五頁）

ソレ故ニ軍備縮サニ就テ相互ノ了解ニ達ス可能性ニテル方策ヲ種々考慮シタ結果我々ハ關係各國間ニ戦争ノ脅威ヲ取除キ又安全ノ平等ヲ確保スルコトヲ第一ノ目的ト致シタリマス。勿論採用ヤラルベキ軍備縮サ案ハ、國家間ノ差別的取扱ヲ正当化スルヤウナ誤ソタ考ヘヲ生ズルコトナイモ、デアレバナリマセン、ソレテ私達ハ其ノ上ニ実行的ナ案デアラトラ保證出来ルヤウニ特ニ留意ヲ致シマシタ。

No. 5  
私が只今申し上げマシタニツノ点ニ就テ十分考慮シ拂ヒ且綿密ニ構想ヲ練ソタ結果我々ノ案ヲ計画致シタノデ私ハ、日本提案ハ公平デシリ、公正デシリ、且実行的デアルト同時に極メテ彈力性ニ富ンダモノデアルト信ジマス。ソレ故ニ若シ代表諸君が我が提案ヲ詳細ニ且ツ同情ノ念ヲ以テ審査査下サルアラバ、ソノ案ノ中ニ軍備縮サニ就



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テ新ナル協定ニ達スルタメ、無理ノナキ基礎ヲ  
發見スルニ重大ナル困難ニ遭遇セラルコトハ明白存  
ジマス。

我々、今日日本、提案ノ最終的、審査直ニ入リ、ウ  
レ居ル故ニ私ハ敢テ以下ノ希望ヲ述べタイト思  
マス。即チ代表諸君ハ、現存ノ予定及週知、  
予情ニ拘泥スルコトナク堅キ決意ヲ以テ、新  
ナル且目取善、成案ヲ得ルタメニ、仕ルニ当面  
ニ其、目的、タメニ、日本、提案ヲ、アラユル角度  
カラ而モ其、精神及目的、同情アル理解ヲ以テ  
研究討議セラルコトヲ希望致スマス。

ニ若シ何レカ、國家ガ、ソリタ、世界、各所テ同  
等ニ惹起セラル必要ヲ豫想シテ一ス海軍力、  
要求ヲ持込ストバ、斯ル要求ハ結果ニ於テ二箇  
國或ハ數箇國ヲ相キトスルニ足ル海軍力、要  
求ニ匹敵スルコトニルカモ知ラセズ。斯ル要求ハ如何  
ナル場合ニモ「一國對一國」ノ關係ヲ基礎ニ考  
慮サルベキ軍備縮小問題ニ於テ了解ニ達  
スル機会ヲ邪魔スルニ至ルヤモ知ラナクテアリマス。

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No. 7

右シニ公同國が望み國ニ均等、立場及相互、安全ヲ保障スル  
ヤナ海軍力ニ就キ條約ヲ取極タルニハ、之、際採用セラルベキ  
基本的方針ハ軍備、均等ト云フコトデアリマス。實際公平ニ  
シテ且公平ナル方法ガ他ニナシト私達ハ考ヘマス。ソシテ是ハ  
海洋ニヨリテ隔テラレ且ツ相互ノ國防ガ夫々、海軍ニノミ依存  
シテ居ルニ固國同ニ於テ特ニ然リデアル。更ニ高次ノ海軍  
軍備機動性ト海戰ノ特異性ヲ考慮スルトキ、全列強、  
防禦力、均等、必要ハ海軍勢力、均等殊ニ艦隊、根幹  
ヲ成ス艦種、均等ヲ要請スルモノデアル。故ニ日本、提議ハ  
甲級巡洋艦及右以上ノ全大型艦種ニ於テ、各艦種毎ニ、  
均等ヲ條件トスルモノデアル。併シ、用途が専ラ防禦的デ  
アル艦種ニ関シテハ、各國、特種事情ニ適應スル様ニ適  
宜ノ調節ヲ施シテ然ルベキモノデアル。故ニ日本、提議條件  
ハ乙級巡洋艦及是以下ノ全小型艦種ニ関シテハ、数量的  
ニ制限ヲ實施スベシトナスモノデアル。左意思ニ容易ニ機動出来  
ルトイフハ海軍力ノ特異性ナル。之ヲ建艦技術、改良ガ  
續ク限リニ於テハ該特異性ガ將來益々明確ニルトイフコト  
ハ言フ候タナシトコロデアル。更ニ數ヶ沙、海域ニ散在シ居ル  
兵力ガ、技術的理曲デ必要、秋ニ、隨時單一水域ニ集結  
出来ルトイフコト、海軍作戰ノ根本原理デアル。コノ事ガ可能  
ナルトイフコト、而シテ、更ニ或國ガ他ノ國ニ對シテ致命的脅威ヲ  
成リ得ル様、ソノ兵力ヲ特定水域ニ集結シ得ルトイフ事例ハ  
海軍史上幾多ノ例ニ依リテ確認サレテ居ルトコロデアル。従テ、  
三國間、海軍關係ヲ議タルニ當ツテハ、少ナクモ



海戦ニ参加し得ル全艦船ヲ考慮ニ入レラルベキ  
モノナリトスルコトハ素ヨリ當然デアリヌタモ  
一國ノ斯ル艦船ノ總數ガ他ノ一國ノソレヨリモ優  
勢ナルニ於テハソノ唯一ノ可能ノ結果ハ劣勢國ノ安  
全感ハ毀ハレルニ至リ優勢海軍國ハソノ國防上實際  
ノ必要度ヲ超過スル地位ヲ占メ引イテハ他ノ列強  
ニ對スル脅威トモナルデアラウ  
更ニ可及的ノ不可侵ノ不脅威ノ狀態ノ完壁ヲ  
期サニガ爲メ我々ノ攻撃武器ノ完全廢棄乃至  
ハ徹底的ノ縮減ヲ主張スルモノデアリ更ニ詳  
説スレバ我々ノ航空母艦ノ廢棄ト主力艦  
及中級巡洋艦ノ徹底的ノ縮減ヲ主張スルモ  
ノデアリ併シモシヌタ主力艦ノ廢棄ヲ支持  
スル一般的意見ガアルナラバ我々ハ之ニ對シ在  
ニテ援助ヲ提供スル用意ガアル  
性格及目的ニ於テ本質的ニ防禦的デアル軍  
備ニ關シテハ各國各々ノ情勢ト狀況ニ最  
適ノ方法デ自身ニ對スル施設ヲ爲スベキコト  
ヲ許容サルベキモ、タト信ズル  
日本側ノ提議、コノ主眼ガ實施サレル  
ナラバ海軍力トイフモノハ他國ヲ脅威ス  
ル其能力ヲ大部分喪失スルモノト吾々ハ信  
ズルモノデアリ。攻撃武器ノ完全廢棄  
乃至思ヒ切リノ縮減ハ直接ノ結果トシテ縮  
少ノ極メテ有力ナル措置トナルバカリデナラウ

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No. 8

尚又各部署ニ亘リ更ニ一層、縮少ヲ招来ス  
 ル間接的效果ヲモ齎ラスモ、ト思フ其故ハ  
 攻撃的艦種、消失カウ結果スル安全感、  
 増進ハ各海軍国間ニシテ、海軍兵力量ヲ更ニ  
 縮減セントスル一般傾向ヲ必ズ醸成スルガ故デ  
 アル。

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三代表者諸賢ニ日本側提議、主眼ヲ今一  
 應想起シテ貫ツ為ニ私ハ此カウ大體次、  
 通り我オ、形式、骨子ヲ披瀝シテ見度イ  
 一先ツ第一ニ如何ナル関係列強ト雖モ超過ス  
 ルコトヲ許サナイ總括的最大限度總噸數ヲ  
 定メテカル。コ、總括的最大限度總噸數ハ  
 實際的目的ニ副フ適度、噸數デアラウネ  
 バナラナイバカリデナラ軍備縮少、精神ニ逆  
 ラハナイ様ニ出来ルガケ低度、水準ニ決定  
 シテ置カナケレバナラナイ。



(二) 總括的噸數、決定ト同時ニ、ソノ性質ニ基キ  
ニ攻撃的ナルト通常見做サレテ居ル艦種——  
即ち主力艦、航空母艦（放棄サレタル場合）  
及甲級巡洋艦ニ對シ——右ノ三種ノ艦種、  
各々ニ關シテ個別的ニ各國ニ許容サレベ  
キ共通ノ最大限噸數及ヒ共通ノ單位數  
ガ決定サレデアラウ。

(三) 乙級巡洋艦及本質的ニ防禦的ト通常  
見做サレル之以下ノ小型艦艇ニ關シテ、各國  
ガ、各々ソノ必要ニ應ジテ、ソレ等各艦種  
ニ適當ト思ハル噸數ヲ決定スルコトガ出来  
ルヤウニスル為ニ、敘上ノ艦種全部ニ對ス  
ル共通ノ總括的ノ最大限噸數ヲ決定スレ  
バ足りルトスルデアアル。

(四) 列強ノイヅレカバ、ソノ特殊事情、理由ニ  
依リ、必要ト認メタ場合ハ、任意ニ甲級巡  
洋艦ノ噸數ヲ減ジテ、第三節ニ述ベタ  
防禦艦種ノ何レカノ噸數ヲ増加シテ  
差支ナイ。

思フニ上述ノ増減ヲ實施スルニハ幾多  
ノ方法ガアルデアアラウガ、ソレハ技術的  
調査、討議課題タラシムベキモノト  
信ズル。

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コノ條項ハ第三セ節ノ條項ト共ニ、各列國ニ、ソノ弱點ヲ填補スルヲ調節ヲナシ得ル甚ダ廣汎ナル餘地ヲ附與スルデアラウ。

(五) 關係列強諸國ハ前述各節ノ諸條項ノ範圍ニ於テ、各國自ラノ自由意志ニ從ツテ各自ノ海軍問題ヲ處理スルヤウ希セラルルノデアルカス。日本案ハ必ズ之モ例ヘバ海軍建造案宣言ノ如キ方式ヲ採用ヲ阻止スルモノデハナイ。

(六) 前述ノ各節ニ於テ企劃サレタ調節以上ノ修正實施ノ必要ヲ主張スル國ガ若シアツタラバ、斯ル主張ハ關係各列強ニ依ツテ周到ニ檢討サレルデアラウ。サウシテ、若シソレガ合理的デ充分根據ノアルモノダト立證サレタラバ、日本ハソノ承認ヲ拒ミナイデアラウ。

併シ、私が繰返シテ説明シタ通り、不可侵不脅威ノ狀態ヲ確立スル。我が提案ノ基盤其物タルヲ以テ、關係

No. 11



國ノ特殊事情カラ生ジタ純然タル防禦的必  
要ニ基ツク追加調節ノ要求ヲ我方ガ認メ  
得ル一方不可侵不脅威ノ状態ヲ危殆ニ瀕セ  
シムルガ如キ海軍戦斗力ノ増強ハ如何ナル状  
況ノ下ニアツテモ我方ガ到底承服デキナイト  
イフコトハ直ニ諒解デキルト思フ。

更ニ其ハ共通ノ最高限度ガ一旦設定セラレト  
シテモ全列強ガ其限度迄必ズ建造シナケレバナ  
ラナイトイフコトヲ意圖シテイルノデハナイ。各  
國ガソノ防禦上ノ必要ニ充分應ジ得ル程  
度ノ最小量ニマデソノ海軍ヲ制限スベキダ  
トイフコトハ言フ俟タナイ。故ニ列強諸國間  
ニ於ル友好ト相互信賴コソハ絶對不可缺  
ノモノデアル。マタ斯ル友好ト相互信賴無シ  
ニハ如何ナル方式ニ據リマタハ如何ナル原理  
ニ基イテソノ企画ガナサレヤウトモ如何ナル  
種類ノ軍備縮少條約ノ締結モ不可能ダト  
イフコトニ就テ委員會ガ我方ト見解ヲ同ジ  
クスルモノナリト信ズルモノデアル。

若シマタ方、日本側提案ニ依ツテ企圖サレテサ  
 通リ、海軍々備カラ他國ヨカ脅威スル能力ヲ奪フ  
 事が出来タナラバ列強諸國ハ廣汎ナル海軍建  
 造ノ必要ヲ感シナクナルデアラウ事實上尤大ナル  
 建艦計畫ヲ目論ムガ如キ列強ハ多分無クナルデア  
 ラウ換言スレバ、各國共ニ通リ最高限度ノ樹立カヨリ  
 大ナル海軍ヘ一般動向ニ刺激ヲ與ヘルガラウト言フ  
 危虞ノ根據ハ存ニヤイト信ズル

四、コノ段階ニ於テ、私が只今説明申上ゲタ日本側  
 提議ノ基調ヲナス根本理令ハニ照ラシテ、我カノ  
 安ホニ對スル他ノ列強代表諸賢ニ依ツテ行ハレタ  
 意見見用陳中、代表諸賢が問題ニサレタニ三ノ  
 點ニ就テ考察スル事ヲ許シテ戴キタイト云フハ  
 我カノ案ノ説明ハサウスル事ニ依ツテ説明シ易ク  
 ナルト感ズルカラデアリマス。



一國のヨロツパ水域或ハ大西洋ニ於テ必要ナリトスル海軍力ニ加フニ同國ス亦太平洋國家タル、故テ以テ更ニ同水域ニ於ケル列國、海軍力ト同等、海軍力ヲ太平洋ニ於テ保有スル權利ヲ與ヘラレルベキナルトスル見解ハ我々、見ル所ナハ事實上、二國或ハソレ以上ノ國、連合シテ海軍ト同等、海軍力ヲ保有スベキ權利ヲ要求スニ異ナル所ナク、我々ハ斯カル要求ハ軍備縮小ニ關スル協定ノ基盤トシテハ殆ト推得カシ得カシト云フテヨクテハナク思ハレマス。且ツ我々トシテハ既ニ指摘セル如ク、海軍武力ノ高度ノ可動性ニ鑑ミ、斯カル要求ヲ支持シ得ナイ、テアリマス。

一國のヨリ廣大大、又ヨリ多數ノ海外領土及ビ交通線ヲ保持スル場合、海上ニ於ケル交戦力ヲ有セシ沿岸警備港灣防衛其他斯ノ種ノ用ニ使スルニ適當ナル小型ニシテ純防衛的型式ノ艦艇ニ於テ他ノ列國ヨリ大ナル海軍力ヲ要求スルコトノ正當ナルコトハ我々トシテ又容易ニ了解スル所ナリマス。併シテ右ノ理由ヲ以テ一國ノ海軍力全体ノ優越ヲ要求スルコトスレバ、他ノ列強ノ安全感ハソノ爲ニ脅カサレコトナリマス。如何ナル場合ニモ現在其ノ海軍力ノ勢力均等ノ基礎ニ建ツテキル國々ノ條件ハ其ノ海外領土

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は交通線に關して、同一の事、周知、事實として信するべきであります。

或は遠隔、領土を防衛する必要として、この點を論及せしめ、併し我々に斯る遠隔、地を領土を防衛するに有優越し、武力を要せしめ、その結果として、他國が正に其の心臓部にその所を脅かすこととなし、其の正當性を理解するに甚だしく困難なり。一國が其の海外領土及び海上交通路を保全し得るや否や、一に其の同國が海を制し得るや否や、これに全う明かして思はれております。

海外領土及び殖民地問題に他面より考察すれば、一國が斯る關係を海外に保持することにより、廣く世界各地に散在する補給、基地及び源を保持し、利益を享受することとなり、明瞭であります。斯る如き交通線、防護、ミナト、海軍力の移動、集結、貿易の便、其の利益を測り知る利益が、これと信じてゐる。

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若し我々が之迄表明せしめたる海に依存する國の巨大な海軍力を必要として、この見解を承認せしめ、日本に、日本を完全な海に依存する國として、おそれ、更に此を止む。



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日本ハ天然資源ニ乏シク人口密度ハ世界、何レノ國ニ於ケルヨリモ稠密デ其ノ存在ニ必要ナ物資ノ大部分モ、其ノ産業業、原材料モ均シク止ラテ海外諸國ニ依存セザルヲ得ナイデアリマス。然レハ一部、物資ハ海外ヨリ取得シツツアルモ其ノ大部分、必需物資ハ自國領土ヨリ補給ヲ受ケ得ル諸國ト日本ト、同ニハ甚シキ途庭ガアリマス此ノ懸隔ハ國內ニ豊饒ナル資源ヲ有シ大半ヲ自給自足シツツアル國ト比較スル時ハ一層顕著トナルデアリマス。斯ル見地ヨリシテ日本、如キ立場ニアル國ガ如何ナルハ遙カニ有利ナル環境ニアル他國ニ比シ劣勢ナル海軍力ヲ以テシテ尚且ツ安全感ヲ抱ケコトヲ要求セテ得ルヤ理解ニ苦シム所デアリマス。

五、結論トシテ述ベタイコトハ日本ハアテ近海軍軍備縮少、廣闊ナル協定締結、希望ヲ捨テルモノデハナリガ同時ニ不可能事ヲ達成ヤント主張スルモノデモナリト云フコトデアリマス。

日本代表部ガ當會議ニ提メシク案ハ過去、軍備縮少會議、經驗ト結果トニ照ラシ今日、國際關係、現實ニ正當ト注意ヲ拂ヒ又閣下ヤル諸種問題ニアリニル角度ヨリ慎重ト考慮ヲ加ヘテ上ニテ作製セラレタモノデアリマス。

而シテ我々、確信スル所ハ日本、提案、中ニ盛ニ

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レヲ諸原則ノ採用ニ依リテ、當會議ニ於テ、大因  
難ヲ伴フコトナク、海軍軍備縮少ノ、全般的協定  
締結ノ達成ニ成功シ得ルト云フコトデアリマス。

當會議ニ於テ一旦日本ノ提案ハ採擇サレテ上ハ、  
適当ト認メラレタリ又更ニ相ヘテ上他ノ諸提案ノ  
重要ナル莫ラ之ニ盛リ込ムベキ方途ヲ見ユスコト  
モ可能デアリマス。

其ノ故ハ日本ノ提案ハ軍備縮少ノ爲、一公式ト  
シテ何等融通ノ利カモテモ又空論ニ走ルモ  
ノデモナリカラデアリマス。本案ハ包括性ト融通  
性ニ富ミ、實際的ナリデアリマス。

日本代表部ハノ提案ノ提ムニ際シ之ガ均シク関  
聯アル全列國ニ満足ヲ與ヘ得シコトヲ熱望シ致シ  
マシタ。我々ハ今回我々ノ提案ヲ當會議ニ提ム  
スルノ運ビトナリマシタガ之ハ軍備縮少ニ効果ナ  
ル手段ヲボメル全世界ノ切ナル希望ニ勵マサレ  
ツク最モ慎重ナル研究ト熟慮トヲ經タス  
デアリマス。

然レバ私ハ最後ノ各代表部ニ於カレテモ同情ヲ  
以テ虚心我々ノ案ニ慎重熟慮ヲ賜ヘラシコトヲ  
要請スルモデアリマス。

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